The axiomatic foundation of logit by Breitmoser, Yves
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
The axiomatic foundation of logit
Yves Breitmoser
Humboldt University Berlin
6 October 2016
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/74334/
MPRA Paper No. 74334, posted 8 October 2016 14:09 UTC
The axiomatic foundation of logit
Yves Breitmoser∗
Humboldt University Berlin
October 6, 2016
Abstract
Multinomial logit is the canonical model of discrete choice but widely criticized for
requiring specific functional assumptions as foundation. The present paper shows
that logit is behaviorally founded without such assumptions. Logit’s functional form
obtains if relative choice probabilities are independent of irrelevant alternatives and
invariant to utility translation (narrow bracketing), to relabeling options (presen-
tation independence), and to changing utilities of third options (context indepen-
dence). Least squares differs from logit only by making the additional assumption
that utility is perceived to be quadratic around the utility maximizer, showing that
logit is the more general model and least squares actually requires specific func-
tional assumptions. Reviewing behavioral evidence, presentation and context in-
dependence seem to be violated in typical experiments, not IIA. Relaxing context
independence yields contextual logit (Wilcox, 2011), relaxing presentation indepen-
dence allows to capture “focality” of options.
JEL–Code: D03, C13
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1 Introduction
Applied theoretical analyses typically rest on preference assumptions as part of their
model primitives. The necessity to understand preferences inspired a large body of work
developing methods to infer preferences from choice. The main difficulty is that choice
is inherently stochastic, which implies that we cannot directly infer preferences from
stated choice.1 Structural models attempt to control for stochastic mistakes in choice,
but proponents of non-structural approaches argue that inference about preferences is
impossible without making functional assumptions about individual choice. This renders
inference on preferences unreliable. Indeed, the structural literature distinguishes three
approaches of defining the locus of noise (random behavior, random preferences, and
random utility),2 for each approach a plethora of possible specifications of noise, and
not a single model has been derived independently of specific functional assumptions.
Thus, in response to the critique, Rust (2014, p. 820) writes that “there is an identification
problem that makes it impossible to decide between competing theories without imposing
ad hoc auxiliary assumptions” on say noise locus and distribution of noise.
This is troublesome, as both the assumed locus of noise and the distributional as-
sumption are known to affect the results on identified preferences (Hey, 2005; Heckman,
2010). Further, different analysts indeed make different assumptions and thus obtain dif-
ferent results, which prevents the emergence of agreement on adequate representations of
preferences. The plethora of approaches coexists exactly because no single approach has
been founded without assuming a specific functional form at some point in the deriva-
tion. As a result, any comparison between alternative approaches boils down to judging
different functional assumptions made in different places in the choice process, which
appears to be impossible based solely on objective arguments (for related discussions,
see e.g. Keane, 2010a,b, and Rust, 2010). For this reason, the coexistence of approaches,
the diversity of contradicting results, and the general critique on structural analyses seem
persistent, suggesting the literature approached a stalemate.
The present paper derives a behavioral foundation of multinomial logit,3 solely re-
lying on axioms on primitives of choice, thus showing that stochastic choice is founded
without functional assumptions. This addresses the above critique and allows me to dis-
cuss logit and related models at a fundamental level: the assumptions underlying logit
1For example, choice is inconsistent across identical trials even after controlling for wealth and portfolio
effects (Camerer, 1989; Starmer and Sugden, 1991), it violates the axioms of revealed preference (Andreoni
and Miller, 2002; Fisman et al., 2007) and dominance relations (Birnbaum and Navarrete, 1998; Costa-
Gomes et al., 2001). For further discussion of stochastic choice, see e.g. Hey (1995) and Wilcox (2008).
2Let u(x|α) denote the decision maker’s utility given preference parameter α and x?(α) the utility max-
imizer. A decision maker with random behavior chooses x?(α)+ ε, with random preferences he chooses
x?(α+ ε), and with random utility he chooses argmaxx{u(x|α)+ εx} for random variables ε and (εx).
3Multinomial logit is the most widely used model of stochastic choice. The long list of studies analyzing
preferences using logit includes analyses of risk preferences (Holt and Laury, 2002; Goeree et al., 2003),
social preferences (Cappelen et al., 2007; Bellemare et al., 2008), and preferences and demand functions
of consumers (McFadden, 1980; Berry et al., 1995).
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in relation to behavioral evidence, logit in relation to random behavior models and least
squares analyses, and the intuition of how logit “averages” noise during preference esti-
mation. This puts the subjective discussion of choice modeling on a solid basis, including
the debate about parametric and nonparametric approaches, and it allows me to discuss
and analyze generalizations of logit relating to behavior in standard experiments.
The main results can be summarized as follows. Choice probabilities have the spe-
cific logit form if choice satisfies independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA), invariance
to utility translation (narrow bracketing), invariance to relabeling (presentation indepen-
dence), and invariance to changing utilities of third options (context independence). IIA
implies that choice probabilities are functions of propensities, narrow bracketing im-
plies a generalized logit form, presentation independence implies that solely utility is
choice relevant, and context independence implies that perturbations have constant vari-
ance across choice tasks. Both presentation independence and context independence are
routinely violated in economic experiments, while IIA and narrow bracketing seem to be
compatible with behavior in “typical” experiments. In particular, evidence on choice vi-
olating IIA tends to resort to experiments explicitly studying similarity effects, while ev-
idence contradicting presentation and context independence prevails across experiments.
Violations of context independence are comparably well-understood: choice is con-
sistent across tasks if the range of potential outcomes is the same. This has been estab-
lished econometrically (Wilcox, 2008, 2015) and explained neurophysiologically (Padoa-
Schioppa and Rustichini, 2014; Rustichini and Padoa-Schioppa, 2015). To reflect this ev-
idence, I also study a weak form of context independence, in conjunction with a cardinal-
ity axiom, which yields contextual logit (Wilcox, 2011). Experimental behavior appears
to be largely compatible with both cardinality of utility and weak context independence,
implying that contextual logit may be preferable to multinomial logit in applied work.
Presentation effects are well-documented, though not formally understood. Choice has
been shown to be affected by ordering, labeling, coloring, and positioning of options,
including round-number and default effects. Dropping presentation independence shows
that choice propensities then depend on two option characteristics, utility and focality.
This finding is discussed briefly in Section 4 and extensively in Breitmoser (2016).
The results further show that both logit and contextual logit are the formal implica-
tion of assumptions tacitly made in most structural analyses. This includes random be-
havior and “least squares” analyses.4 The latter equally assume IIA, narrow bracketing
(even cardinality), and either context independent noise (similarly to logit) or context de-
pendent, heteroscedastic noise (similarly to contextual logit). Further, all of these models
assume that presentation effects are neutral in the sense that the utility maximizer always
is the modal choice. The only difference between logit and least squares affects the way
noise depends on presentation. Logit assumes that choice probabilities depend on utility
4Random behavior with normal trembles, i.e. least squares, has been used to estimate risk and time
preferences (Choi et al., 2007; Andreoni and Sprenger, 2012), as well as utility parameters of subjects in
dictator games (Fisman et al., 2007; Jakiela, 2013), public goods games (Bardsley and Moffatt, 2007), and
auctions (Bajari and Hortacsu, 2005; Campo et al., 2011), to name just a few examples.
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differences, while least squares assumes that choice probabilities depend on squared dis-
tances to the utility maximizer. To be clear, logit posits that the probability of choosing
x ∈ X given utility u : X → R is
PrLogit(x|X) = exp{λ ·u(x)}∑x′∈X exp{λ ·u(x′)}
,
for some noise parameter λ ∈ R. Least squares is equivalent to assuming that choices
are normally distributed around the utility maximizer x? ∈ argmaxx′∈X u(x′), assuming it
is unique, with an unknown standard deviation σ. Thus, using φ to denote the standard
normal density, least squares assumes that the choice probabilities are
PrLS(x) =
φ
(x−x?
σ
)
∑x′ φ
(x′−x?
σ
) = 1√2σ2pi · exp{− (x−x?)22σ2 }
∑x′ 1√2σ2pi · exp
{− (x′−x?)22σ2 } =
exp
{−λ(x− x?)2}
∑x′ exp
{−λ(x′− x?)2} .
Note that this reformulation does not squeeze least squares into the logit form, but simply
takes the normal density, the normalization constant 1/
√
2σ2pi cancels out, and the free
parameters are aligned letting λ = 1/2σ2. Thus, least squares obeys the logit form, i.e.
logit’s axioms, and additionally assumes that DM misperceives his asserted true utility u,
for which the analyst estimates the parameters, as a quadratic function u˜(x) =−(x−x?)2,
or equivalently, u˜(x) = u(x?)− (x− x?)2. This additional assumption is not supported by
behavioral evidence, implying that logit uses not just theoretically weaker assumptions.5
However, least squares provides a simple interpretation of how noise is averaged out dur-
ing utility estimation and in principle requires little more than the back of an envelope
to compute. Thus, least squares analyses may appear to be more transparent than logit,
which may be taken informally as indication that the results are more robust. Logit has a
similarly intuitive computational interpretation, derived below from its axiomatic founda-
tion, which may help improve the perceived transparency of logit analyses. Briefly, take
a parametric utility function and aggregate the utilities over all of DM’s choices. Logit’s
estimate maximizes this aggregate utility (in a sense to be made precise), yielding the
utility parameters under which DM’s choices are as reasonable as possible, i.e. as close
to utility maximization as possible.
Section 2 reviews the four existing foundations of logit, showing that all of them
require specific functional assumptions in one place or another. Section 3 provides the
behavioral foundations of multinomial logit and contextual logit avoiding such assump-
tions, solely using “axioms” stating invariance properties of choice. Section 4 discusses
these axioms in relation to behavioral evidence and the computational intuition underly-
ing logit. Section 5 concludes. The appendix contains all proofs.
5Note the difference to regression. Least squares robustly estimates the mean effect of some variable
x on another variable y. Analysts interested in utility parameters seek to understand how payoffs affect
utilities and thus choice. This is not a regression, as the payoffs are not exogenous but depend on the
choice made by DM, implying that least squares does not inherit the robustness from regression.
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2 Existing foundations of logit
The notation is standard. Decision maker DM chooses option x ∈ B from a finite budget
B ⊆ X with probability Pr(x|B). DM’s utility u : X → R is unknown, the subject of the
analysis, and DM’s choice exhibits stochastic noise with unknown distribution, the main
obstacle of the analysis. The set of all finite subsets of X is denoted as P(X), and DM’s
choice profile Pr is a collection of probability distributions over all finite subsets of X ,
denoted as Pr = {∆(B)}B∈P(X). The utility of option x is denoted as ux.
2.1 Unconditional logit
The original definition of logit, Luce (1959), states that choice is logit if a value function
v : X→R exists such that Pr has a logit representation. This definition is “unconditional”
in that no condition about v’s relation to u is imposed, distinguishing it from conditional
logit defined by McFadden (1974) where v = u. Note that both conditional and uncondi-
tional models are called logit or multinomial logit in the literature.
Definition 1 (Unconditional logit). The choice profile Pr has an unconditional logit rep-
resentation if there exists v : X → R such that
Pr(x|B) = exp{v(x)}
∑x′∈B exp{v(x′)}
for all x ∈ B ∈ P(X).
A scaling factor λ as it is used below can be skipped without loss of generality. Since
v ex-post rationalizes DM’s choice, I refer to it as DM’s choice utility, thus distinguishing
it from the true utility u. Note that v is the choice utility specifically in relation to logit’s
functional form and defined only up to translation (addition of arbitrary constants).
Choice utility simply is a function of observed choice, for example v(x) := logPr(x|X)
is adequate, and as such, it merely summarizes the information about utility contained in
DM’s choice profile. The main question will be what we can learn from it, i.e. how v
relates to u. To begin with, v is defined if the choice profile Pr has an unconditional logit
representation, which is the case if Pr exhibits independence of irrelevant alternatives
(IIA). Assuming all choice probabilities are positive, Pr obeys IIA if
Pr(x|B)
Pr(y|B) =
Pr(x|B′)
Pr(y|B′) for all x,y ∈ B∩B
′, (1)
for all B,B′ ∈ P(X). Following Luce (1959), the choice probabilities satisfy IIA if and
only if a propensity function V : X → R exists such that
Pr(x|B) = V (x)
∑x′∈BV (x′)
for all x ∈ B ∈ P(X).
In this case, Pr is said to have a Luce representation. By positivity, Pr has a Luce repre-
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sentation if and only if it has an unconditional logit representation, as v(x) = logV (x) =
logPr(x|X) for all x ∈ X is then well-defined. That is, the choice probabilities satisfy
IIA if and only if they have an unconditional logit representation, and in this sense, IIA
and (unconditional) logit are equivalent. Fudenberg and Strzalecki (2015) establish this
equivalence (amongst others) in a general model of dynamic choice.
Logit is not special in this respect, IIA is equivalent to any representation based on
choice propensities. For example, fix any bijection g : M→R+ for some M ⊆R and say
that Pr has an unconditional g-representation if v : X → R exists such that
Pr(x|B) = g(v(x))
∑x′∈B g(v(x′))
for all x ∈ B ∈ P(X). (2)
If choice satisfies IIA, then propensities V (x) exist and Pr has a g-representation for any
g, as v(x) := g−1(V (x)) is well-defined. Thus, IIA is equivalent to any g-representation,
rendering the equivalence of IIA and logit uninformative. As logit is only one of many
possible specifications of g, unconditional logit thus makes a functional assumption (g =
exp). Unconditional logit is assumed without loss of generality only if choice utility v
is an affine transformation of true utility u. This obtains if Pr has a conditional logit
representation, as defined next.
2.2 Conditional logit
DM’s choice profile is conditional logit if the logit representation is adequate given the
true utility function u. This follows McFadden (1974), who also analyzes the theoreti-
cal foundation of conditional logit.6 To define the model, let us extend the notation by
conditioning on u, i.e. given u, DM chooses option x ∈ B with probability Pr(x|u,B)> 0.
Definition 2 (Conditional logit). The choice profile Pr has a conditional logit represen-
tation if there exists λ ∈ R such that, given DM’s utility u : X → R,
Pr(x|u,B) = exp{λ ·ux}
∑x′∈B exp{λ ·ux′}
for all x ∈ B ∈ P(X).
If Pr is conditional logit, then Pr also has an unconditional logit representation and
the choice utility satisfies v = λu+ r for some r ∈ R. Then, the choice utility is an affine
transformation of true utility u and logit analyses indeed allow us to infer DM’s utility.
Conditions for Pr to be conditional logit have been analyzed by McFadden (1974).
In a first step, McFadden (1974) shows that positivity and IIA imply that DM’s choice
6McFadden characterizes a logit model conditioning on individual attributes of DM. These individual
attributes may represent free parameters in a utility representation such as CRRA. Conditional on these
parameters, utility then is defined, and for the purpose of the current analysis, we may condition on the
utility function itself, as is standard practice in behavioral analyses (see below).
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probabilities can be represented as
Pr(x|u,B) = exp{v(x,y|u)}
∑x′∈B exp{v(x′,y|u)}
for all x ∈ B,y ∈ X (3)
for some function v, given any benchmark option y ∈ X . In contrast to the unconditional
approach, which shows that choice utility simply is defined if choice is IIA, this shows
that the choice utility of x can be defined in relation to a single benchmark option y, i.e.
references to other options x′ ∈ X are not required. McFadden (1974) derives Eq. (3) by
defining v(x,y|u) to be the log-odds of the choice between x and y,
v(x,y|u) = log
(
Pr(x|u,{x,y})
Pr(y|u,{x,y})
)
. (4)
IIA then implies Eq. (3). Since Pr(x|u,{x,y}) and Pr(y|u,{x,y}) may depend only on
x,y,ux,uy, besides constants, this pins down the arguments of choice utility v. Any y ∈ X
may be chosen as benchmark option, but if X is scarce, it may be impossible to express v
independently of a benchmark option; a richness condition resolves this issue below.
Eq. (4) does not substantially restrict v and is compatible with many families of
stochastic choice models, including strong utility, strict utility, and random behavior (in-
cluding least squares),7 implying that the relation of v to DM’s true utility u is still un-
determined. McFadden resolves this by Axiom 3 (page 110) assuming that the relative
choice utility v(x,y|u) is the difference of the utilities of x and benchmark y.
v(x,y|u) = ux−uy (5)
Given the exponential formulation of choice utility, the benchmark utility uy thus cancels
out and choice utility v(x) is implicitly assumed to equate with true utility ux. Thus, Ax-
iom 3 achieves the following: out of the vast set of potential functional forms compatible
with v(x,y,ux,uy), it selects v(x) = ux, implying that the benchmark utility uy and the op-
tions x and y as such are choice irrelevant, but it obviously represents a specific functional
assumption. The nature of the assumption becomes clearer using v’s definition Eq. (4),
which implies that McFadden’s Axiom 3 is equivalent to assuming
Pr(x|u,{x,y})
Pr(y|u,{x,y}) = exp{ux−uy} ⇔
Pr(x|·)+Pr(y|·)
Pr(y|u,{x,y}) = 1+ exp{ux−uy}
⇔ Pr(y|u,{x,y})
Pr(x|·)+Pr(y|·) =
1
1+ exp{ux−uy} =
exp{uy}
exp{ux}+ exp{uy}
⇔ Pr(x|u,{x,y}) = exp{ux}
exp{ux}+ exp{uy} ,
7Random behavior has been defined in Footnote 2. Pr has a strong utility representation if Pr(x|u,B) =
f (ux − uy)/∑x′∈B f (ux′ − uy) for some f : R→ R+ and y ∈ X . Pr has a strict utility representation if
Pr(x|u,B) = (ux)λ/∑x′∈B(ux′)λ for some λ ∈ R. See also Luce and Suppes (1965).
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noting that Pr(x|·) + Pr(y|·) = 1. The last equation is the definition of binomial logit
(omitting λ), i.e. Axiom 3 is equivalent to assuming that binomial choice is logit. In
turn, logit itself is not behaviorally founded; IIA merely extrapolates binomial logit to
multinomial choice. This implication of Axiom 3 does not seem to have been observed
in the existing literature, but it clearly shows that the existing foundation of conditional
logit makes a functional assumption. Instead of assuming that binomial choice is logit,
we could assume any other structure of binomial choice and then would obtain any other
model compatible with IIA. For example, replacing Axiom 3 with v(x,y|u) = g(ux−uy)
for any monotone and positive g, we obtain any strong utility model.
2.3 Foundation as random utility model
Thurstone (1927) introduced the random utility model for binomial choice, focusing on
utility perturbations with normal distribution. Block and Marschak (1960) introduced
the multinomial random utility model allowing for arbitrary distributions of the utility
perturbations. Accordingly, choice profile Pr has a random utility representation if, given
utility u, there exists a collection of random variables (Rx)x∈X such that
Pr(x|u,B) = P(ux+Rx ≥max
x′∈X
ux′+Rx′
)
(6)
for all x ∈ B and B ∈ P(X). McFadden (1974) shows that conditional logit results if
the utility perturbations (Rx) are i.i.d. with extreme value type 1 distribution, Yellott
(1977) shows that an i.i.d. random utility model satisfies IIA if and only if the utility
perturbations have this particular distribution, and Strauss (1979) generalizes the result to
the non-i.i.d. case. Thus, random utility models with any alternative distribution, whether
or not the perturbations are i.i.d., violate independence of irrelevant alternatives.8 In this
sense, the extreme value distribution is indeed specific: it is not one of many possible
choices, but the only possible choice compatible with IIA. Given IIA, in turn, the critical
assumption is not that the utility perturbations have an extreme value distribution, but
that the choice profile admits a random utility representation in the first place.
Considering the plethora of stochastic choice models that satisfy IIA, the assumed
adequacy of the random utility representation is obviously not innocuous. Indeed, given
IIA, assuming that the choice probabilities have a random utility representation is equiva-
lent to assuming that binomial choice is logit (see also Adams and Messick, 1958)—given
IIA, either assumption implies that multinomial choice is logit. This shows that an as-
sumption equivalent to McFadden’s Axiom 3 is implied by assuming adequacy of the
random utility representation, although it is less obvious.
Relatedly, Thurstone’s additive random utility model is not the only way of rep-
8Robertson and Strauss (1981) clarify the reason. Let Y denote the maximum of n random variables that
are i.i.d. aside from location shifts and let I denote the index of the variable attaining the maximum. Y and I
are independent if and only if the random variables have the extreme value distribution. This independence
ensures that the odds of choosing between two options are independent of the options otherwise available.
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resenting stochastic choice by means of random variables. Alternative models include
random behavior models (see e.g. Harless and Camerer, 1995) and random preference
models (Falmagne, 1978; Barberà and Pattanaik, 1986), and within all model families,
there are countless functional forms of incorporating perturbations. Not all of these func-
tional forms are equally appealing, but it is clear that the functional form assumed with
the additive random utility representation is just one of many possibilities.
2.4 Foundation in rational inattention
Matejka and McKay (2015) model choice if DM is rationally inattentive in the sense of
Sims (2003). DM has limited information about the state of the world, and the state of
the world defines DM’s mapping of options to utilities. DM may study the state, at a cost,
to reduce the uncertainty he faces. Implicitly, DM has to choose which options to study
and when to stop, trading off the knowledge he gains about his utility function and his
costs of studying it. After studying the state of the world, DM chooses the option with
the highest expected utility. DM can buy information about the state at costs proportional
to the amount of uncertainty removed by the obtained information, and here, uncertainty
is measured using Shannon entropy.9
Matejka and McKay show that DM’s choice probabilities have a generalized logit
representation: given utility u, there exist a function w : X→R and some λ ∈R such that
Pr(x|B) = exp{λ ·ux+w(x)}
∑x′∈B exp{λ ·ux′+w(x′)}
for all x ∈ B ∈ P(X).
Matejka and McKay show that w(x) reflects DM’s prior beliefs about the optimal option,
which in turn depends on the prior belief about the state and the set of possible states. By
knowing the set of possible states, DM detects similar options and implicitly adapts his
information strategy to similarity. Thus, w(x) captures similarity effects and allows for
violations of IIA as predicted by the red-bus/blue-bus example of Debreu (1960).
If DM’s prior belief is flat, then w(x) = const and cancel out, yielding conditional
logit. Matejka and McKay (2015) work with the standard model of rational inattention
and use the most widely adopted measure of entropy, but the Shannon entropy represents
only an instance of a large family of entropy measures (Rényi, 1960). Its assumption is
not behaviorally founded and thus it does not resolve the issue that specific functional
assumptions must be made to characterize logit. For example, discussing Matejka and
McKay’s cost function based on Shannon entropy, Caplin and Dean (2015) “outline key
behavioral properties implied by this cost function, which are significantly more restric-
tive than NIAS and NIAC alone” (p. 2), referring to two general conditions (NIAS and
NIAC) characterizing rational information acquisition.
9The Shannon entropy of a random variable is defined as H =−∑i P(si) logP(si), with (si) as possible
realizations of the random variable and P(si) as their respective probabilities.
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2.5 Discussion
Parametric structural analyses are criticized for their functional assumptions, e.g. on error
distributions or on choice functions. This concerns in particular also logit, as all four of
logit’s foundations build on functional assumptions, but is equally true for any other
choice model. To refute the criticism, we may pick any of the four foundations and
derive the functional assumption from say invariance assumptions. Completion of the
other foundations follows by corollary. I will focus on the behavioral foundation of
conditional logit. Conditional logit is generally preferred in applied work,10 in relation
to unconditional logit it mitigates the standard critique that utilities are defined post-hoc
to rationalize choice,11 and in relation to the other approaches, it avoids unobservable
non-primitive entities such as utility perturbations or information purchases.
Another advantage of conditional logit is that it naturally allows to analyze choice
across contexts. For example, experimenters tend to vary prizes in lotteries or transfer
rates in dictator games, both as defined shortly, within subjects. In order to study the
foundations of logit also in such analyses, we need to condition on the context. Different
contexts induce different (unknown) utility functions across options, and thus it suffices
to condition on the unknown but distinct utility function induced in a given context. This,
in turn, is done in conditional logit.
3 The axiomatic foundation of logit
3.1 The model
As indicated, I extend the usual framework by allowing that the experiment spans multi-
ple “contexts”. This reflects the standard practice to analyze choice in response to varying
prizes in lotteries, to varying transfer rates in Dictator games, and to varying signals in
auctions. In all of these examples, the mapping from options to utilities varies across
tasks, to which I refer as a variation of context. Typical assumptions in such analyses
are that noise variance either is constant or varies as a function of context in a specific
manner, but no such assumption has been behaviorally founded. From a technical point
of view, allowing for context variation allows me to analyze “cardinal utility” rigorously,
i.e. the implications of requiring choice to be robust to translation or affine transformation
of utility. Such transformations induce different utility functions, i.e. different contexts,
10Seemingly all behavioral analyses using logit define logit according to Def. 2, i.e. take at least the
functional form of utility as given or fix it entirely. The list of examples is extremely long and includes
analyses of risk preferences, for overviews see Wilcox (2008) and Harrison and Rutström (2008), time
preferences (Andersen et al., 2008), and social preferences (Goeree et al., 2002; Cappelen et al., 2007).
Analyses of strategic behavior and learning usually fix utility uniquely and vary only precision λ, following
McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) and Camerer and Ho (1999). For a review, see Camerer and Ho (2015).
11See e.g. Cohen and Dickens (2002). This assumes, of course, that conditional logit analyses adapt the
utility function it fits behavior, which would be equivalent to the unconditional approach.
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and hence their analysis requires a formal representation of context variation.
The notation is extended appropriately. A choice task is a duple (u,B), where deci-
sion maker DM has to choose an option x ∈ B from a finite set B ⊆ X given his utility
u : X →R. Given choice task (u,B), the probability that DM chooses x ∈ B is denoted as
Pr(x|u,B). The set of choice tasks (u,B) isD =U×P(X);U denotes the set of unknown
utility functions u : X → R underlying DM’s choices in the various contexts, and P(X)
denotes the set of finite subsets of X . To be clear, ux captures the welfare DM derives
from option x in a given context—the utility function is known to exist, but its values are
unknown to the analyst and the object of his analysis. To clarify the model primitives, let
me discuss two examples.
Example 1 (Choice under risk). There are four prizes, (pi1,pi2,pi3,pi4) and each option is
a lottery L = (pii, p,pi j) yielding pii with probability p and pi j with probability 1− p. The
set of options is X = [0,2] and option x ∈ X is defined as
L(x) =
{
(pi1,x,pi2), if x≤ 1
(pi3,x−1,pi4), if x > 1
The unknown utility ux is DM’s (expected) utility of lottery L(x), x ∈ X. Different prizes
induce different contexts, i.e. different mappings from options to (expected) utility.
It is straightforward to generalize the example to multinomial choice or choice from
lotteries with more than two possible outcomes by partitioning X into more subsets.
Many experiments implement lists of such choice tasks following Holt and Laury (2002).
These lists ask DM to choose between risky and save lotteries, pi1 > pi3 > pi4 > pi2, for a
sequence of probabilities such as p= 0.1,0.2, . . . ,1. Using the above notation, such a list
consists of the tasks {0.1,1.1},{0.2,1.2}, . . . ,{1,2}, i.e. {{k/10,10+ k/10}}k=1,...,10.
Example 2 (Dictator game). DM is endowed with E tokens, each token is worth τ1 points
to DM and τ2 points to a second player (recipient). The set of options is [0,1], and option
x ∈ X implies that DM keeps x ·E tokens for himself and transfers (1− x) ·E tokens to
the recipient. The unknown utility function maps options (or, point distributions) to DM’s
welfare, and different transfer rates τ1,τ2 or endowments E induce different contexts.
Experimental analyses often involve variation of transfer rates and endowments (i.e.
“contexts”) within subjects, see e.g. Andreoni and Miller (2002), Harrison and Johnson
(2006), and Fisman et al. (2007). Generalized dictator games allowing for “taking” from
the recipient’s endowment and incomplete information of the recipient about the number
of tokens available to DM are captured straightforwardly by adapting X or defining prior
beliefs on the distribution of the endowment.
Maintained assumptions Throughout the paper, I assume that the set of choice tasks
D is “rich” and that the choice probabilities Pr(·|u,B) are positive.
Assumption 1 (Richness). The set of choice tasks D =U×P(X) is called rich if
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1. Transformability: a+bu ∈U for all u ∈U and all a,b ∈ R : b > 0,
2. Convexity: X is a convex subset of R and |X |> 1,
3. Surjectivity: for all u ∈U, the image u[X ] = {ux|x ∈ X} is a convex subset of R
and not a singleton, and
4. Choice variation: there exists u∈U and x,x′ ∈X such that Pr(x|u,X) 6= Pr(x′|u,X).
Transformability ensures that we may analyze affine transformations of utility func-
tions in the first place, by ensuring that all affine transformations are well-defined objects.
Convexity and surjectivity primarily rule out scarce choice environments where the sets
of options or realized utility levels (respectively) are finite or even singletons; but it will
be notationally convenient to know that both domain and image of DM’s utility are con-
vex. Such assumptions are similarly made by Gul et al. (2014) and Fudenberg et al.
(2015) and satisfied in choice tasks typically of interest to experimentalists (as in the ex-
amples above, using standard utility functions). Note that the utility functions may still
be fairly ill-behaved, violating smoothness or even continuity for any number points. Fur-
ther, “surjectivity” permits us to normalize utilities through dividing by supu− infu.12
Finally, “Choice variation” rules out that choice probabilities are uniform in all contexts.
Assumption 2 (Positivity). For all choice tasks (u,B) ∈D and all x ∈ B, Pr(x|u,B)> 0.
Positivity assumes that DM does not generally manage to maximize utility and cap-
tures the widely documented phenomena that individual choice fluctuates and that dom-
inated options have positive probability, i.e. options that fail to maximize utility for any
conceivable utility function. This has been observed in choice under risk and uncer-
tainty (Birnbaum and Navarrete, 1998), in small normal-form games (Costa-Gomes et al.,
2001), and through violations of revealed preference axioms in simple distribution deci-
sions such as dictator games (Andreoni and Miller, 2002; Fisman et al., 2007). Stochastic
choice offers a simple explanation of such observations. Positivity does not imply restric-
tions on the locus of noise in the choice process, i.e. it is compatible with random behav-
ior, random utility and even random preferences.13 Positivity also is technically mild in
the sense that empirically, an event occurring with zero probability is indistinguishable
from one occurring with positive but small probability (McFadden, 1974).
3.2 Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and Luce
IIA has been introduced in Eq. (1), but let me restate IIA for the more general choice
environment analyzed now, allowing IIA to hold for each context u ∈U.
12Writing supu and infu, I refer to u’s supremum and infimum, respectively, over its domain (X), i.e.
supu = supx∈X ux and infu = infx∈X ux.
13Random preference models (Falmagne, 1978; Barberà and Pattanaik, 1986) violate positivity in some
contexts, but in general they are ruled out only by IIA. Random behavior models will be ruled out by
presentation independence, as discussed below. Thus, for the purpose of interpretation, the reader may
assume that DM has a well-defined utility function but a perturbed perception of it, as in the random utility
model Eq. (6) or in the rational inattention model of Matejka and McKay (2015).
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Axiom 1 (Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, IIA). For all (u,B),(u,B′) ∈D ,
Pr(x|u,B)
Pr(y|u,B) =
Pr(x|u,B′)
Pr(y|u,B′) for all x,y ∈ B∩B
′.
Since Debreu (1960), IIA has been criticized for its incompatibility with similarity
effects, i.e. the intuition that similar options are not evaluated and chosen independently
(further discussed below). In typical experiments, similarity effects are deliberately lim-
ited by experimental design, to enable clean inference unless the purpose is to study
similarity effects. As a foundation of IIA, Gul et al. (2014) show that if choice probabili-
ties are countably additive, IIA generally obtains if DM’s (stochastic) preference ordering
is complete. Given IIA, choice probabilities have a Luce representation, i.e. a propen-
sity function V : X → R exists such that Pr(x|B) = V (x)/∑x′∈BV (x′) (Luce, 1959). For
example, define V (x) := Pr(x|X) ·r for any r > 0. The Luce representation and the equiv-
alence to IIA straightforwardly generalizes to multiple contexts. The following result
further shows that propensities are functions solely of x and ux, thus tightening the result
of McFadden (1974) discussed above using the richness assumption.
Definition 3 (Luce). The choice profile Pr is Luce if there exists a family of functions
{Vu : X×R→ R}u∈U such that for all tasks (u,B) ∈D and options x ∈ B,
Pr(x|u,B) =V (x|u)/ ∑
x′∈B
V (x′|u) with V (x|u) =Vu(x,ux). (7)
Lemma 1. Pr is Luce⇔ Pr satisfies Axiom 1.
Choice propensities Vu may still be context dependent, as IIA itself does not restrict
choice across contexts. Even the functional forms of Vu may vary across contexts, and
expressed in terms of model primitives, V simply is a collection of functions {Vu}u∈U
mapping options x and utilities ux to real-valued propensities, for all u ∈U. Applied to
any single context, this result is tighter than McFadden’s, as it shows that the reference
to a benchmark y and its utility uy are not required. Still, IIA is compatible with a wide
range of choice models. As illustration, consider the following family of choice models
satisfying IIA with choice propensities being functions solely of x and ux.
Pr(x|u,B) = Vu(x,ux)
∑x′∈BVu(x′,ux′)
with Vu(x,ux) = c1|u+ fu
(
ux−c2|u
)
+gu
(
x−c3|u
)
(8)
with { fu,gu}u∈U being context-specific functions (R→ R), and for the purpose of il-
lustration, they involve context-specific constants {c1|u,c2|u,c3|u}u∈U . Let for example
c2|u = supx∈X ux and (if existent) c3|u = argmaxx∈X ux, implying that the strong utility
and random behavior models are contained as special cases. This shows that the locus of
noise is virtually unrestricted by IIA, only similarity effects are ruled out. Implicitly, we
cannot infer any information on the relation of propensities V and utilities u from IIA. In
relation to this family of models, McFadden’s Axiom 3 assumes V (x|u) = exp{ux−uy}
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for some y ∈ X , i.e. specifically fu = exp, c2|u = uy, and c1|u = gu = 0.
3.3 Narrow bracketing and cardinality
Standard representation theorems imply that utility is defined only up to affine transfor-
mation. These theorems assume rational choice and it is not obvious why they should
generalize to stochastic choice. Robustness to affine transformations may still appear de-
sirable, however, as it justifies standard assumptions in applied work. On the one hand,
invariance to translation of utilities (addition of arbitrary constants) implies that, if we
assume that DM’s utility is the sum of “background utility” and “experiment utility”,
the background utility can be factored out and the choice pattern is invariant to the level
of the background utility. Then, DMs approach any single choice task independently of
background utility and previous tasks, which is generally assumed in behavioral analyses.
Following Read et al. (1999), I refer to it as narrow bracketing.
Axiom 2 (Narrow bracketing). Pr(·|u,B) = Pr(·|u+ r,B) for all r ∈ R, (u,B) ∈D
On the other hand, invariance of choice to scaling utilities is robustly observed in
experiments. A detailed discussion follows below, but essentially, when experimental
payoffs are scaled, expected utilities of options scale proportionally under standard as-
sumptions,14 but observed choice probabilities are largely unaffected by such scaling.
This holds both within subjects and between subject; for discussion, see e.g. Wilcox
(2011) and Padoa-Schioppa and Rustichini (2014).
Axiom 3 (Cardinality). Pr(·|u,B) = Pr(·|a+bu,B) for all a,b ∈ R : b > 0, (u,B) ∈D
Narrow bracketing obtains if choice propensities are functions of utility differences,
as in strong utility models (Block and Marschak, 1960), and scale invariance obtains if
propensities are functions of utility ratios, as in strict utility models. While strong utility
models and strict utility models in the strict sense have an empty intersection,15 requiring
robustness to affine transformation is of course not prohibitive. Amongst others,
Pr(x|u,B) = f
(
ux− infu
supu− infu
)
/ ∑
x′∈B
f
(
ux′− infu
supu− infu
)
for any function f : R+ → R+ satisfies cardinality (and IIA). With f (r) = exp(r) we
obtain contextual logit (Wilcox, 2011), and with f (r) = rλ we obtain a normalized strict
utility model (noting that the denominator cancels out). Similarly, all random behavior
models (including least squares) are consistent with both cardinality and IIA. The next
result establishes that in general, narrow bracketing merely implies a “relative Luce”
representation of choice and cardinality implies a “standardized Luce” representation.
14This applies if the utility function is homogeneous in the payoffs, which is satisfied for utility functions
used in behavioral analyses, such as CRRA, CES, inequity aversion or Prospect theoretic utilities.
15Recall the definition in Footnote 7 or see Luce and Suppes (1965).
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Definition 4 (Relative/Standardized Luce). The choice profile Pr is relative (standard-
ized) Luce if there exist functions {Vu : X ×R→ R+}u∈U such that for all choice tasks
(u,B) ∈D and all options x ∈ B, Pr(x|u,B) =V (x|u)/∑x′∈BV (x′|u) with
V (x|u) =Vu(x,ux− infu), (Relative Luce)
V (x|u) =Vu
(
x, ux−infusupu−infu
)
. (Standardized Luce)
Lemma 2.
1. Axioms 1 and 2⇔ Pr is relative Luce with Vu =Vu+r (∀r ∈ R)
2. Axioms 1 and 3⇔ Pr is standardized Luce with Vu =Va+bu (∀a,b ∈ R : b > 0)
This suggests that neither narrow bracketing nor cardinality are restrictive. To illus-
trate, the family of representations compatible with IIA and cardinality include
Pr(x|u,B) =
fu
( ux−infu
supu−infu
)
+gu(x− x?)
∑x′∈B fu
( ux′−infu
supu−infu
)
+gu(x′− x?)
(9)
for functions { fu,gu :R→R+}u∈U , assuming fu = fa+bu,gu = ga+bu for a,b∈R : b> 0
(reflecting the conditions in Lemma 2). Besides contextual logit and normalized strict
utility as discussed above, this still allows for general random behavior models, using
fu = 0 and x? ∈ argmaxu (assuming it is defined), for least squares if additionally gu(y) =
φ(y/σ) with φ as standard normal density, and for arbitrary combinations of say strict
utility and random behavior. Thus, neither IIA nor cardinality (or narrow bracketing)
seem to imply any restriction of how choice propensities relate to utility u.
This impression is misleading. If choice is consistent across contexts, in a sense to
be made precise, then narrow bracketing and cardinality allow us to infer that fu(r) =
exp(λr) for all contexts u ∈U . This will imply that choice is represented by generalized
formulations of conditional logit and contextual logit, depending on whether we require
narrow bracketing or cardinality. Thus, on their own, narrow bracketing and cardinality
are fairly weak requirements, but they have further implications once we know more
about choice across contexts.
3.4 Presentation independence and context independence
Fix any utility function u and assume, for purpose of illustration, that ux = 2 and uy = 0,
for some x,y ∈ X . Now consider u′ = u+ 8, which implies u′x = 10 and u′y = 8. By
narrow bracketing, or cardinality, we know that the relative probability of choosing x
over y is equal in both contexts u and u′. Two seemingly related invariances are not
implied. On the one hand, assume there exist x′,y′ ∈ X with utilities 10 and 8 in the
original context u, i.e. ux′ = 10 and uy′ = 8. Narrow bracketing does not imply that the
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relative probability of choosing 10 (x′) over 8 (y′) in context u is equal to the one of
choosing 2 (x) over 0 (y) in context u—although we know that choosing between 2 and 0
under u is equivalent to choosing between 10 and 8 in a different context u′. I refer to this
phenomenon as “presentation effect”: The probability of choosing an option with a given
utility may depend on which option attains this utility. For example, presentation effects
may reflect labeling or ordering of options, and are even implied in random behavior
models. Random behavior assumes that choice probabilities depend on the distance to
the utility maximizer, implying that options with equal utilities have different choice
probabilities if utility is not symmetric around the maximizer. Formally, presentation
effects are compatible with relative Luce, as choice propensities are functions Vu(x,ux−
infu), i.e. option x itself is choice relevant. Presentation independence results if choice
satisfies permutation invariance: given context u ∈U and any bijective function f : X →
X , permuting choice probabilities (via f ) is equivalent to permuting utilities (via f ),
Pr( f (x) |u, f (B)) = Pr(x |u◦ f ,B) for all x ∈ B ∈ P(X). (10)
Intuitively, given presentation independence, propensities can be expressed as functions
Vu(ux− infu) independently of x itself, but this is not formally implied, as u◦ f represents
a context different from u, i.e. we also need information on context dependence of choice.
On the other hand, assume there exists u′′ such that u′′x = 2 and u′′y = 0, but u 6= u′′.
Hence u′′ is neither a translation nor an affine transformation of u, and choice propen-
sities under u and u′′ may be entirely unrelated given Lemma 2. This captures “context
dependence”: The relative probabilities of choosing options with given utilities depend
on context. Strict context independence obtains if for all u,u′ ∈U and all x,y ∈ X ,
ux = u′x and uy = u
′
y ⇒ Pr(x|u,{x,y}) = Pr(x|u′,{x,y}). (11)
By IIA, this implies that the relative probability of choosing x over y is equal in u and
u′ for all budget sets B ∈ P(X). Given the behavioral evidence reviewed below, strict
context independence appears to be unrealistically strict, and for this reason, let me also
introduce the notion of weak context independence: Implication (11) applies only if the
utility range in contexts u and u′ is equal, i.e. if supu− infu = supu′− infu′. I say that
choice exhibits strict/weak utility relevance if it exhibits presentation independence and
strict/weak context independence, respectively.
Axiom 4 (Strict utility relevance, SUR). For all u,u′ ∈U and all x,x′,y,y′ ∈ X ,
ux = u′x′ and uy = u
′
y′ ⇒ Pr(x|u,{x,y}) = Pr(x′|u′,{x′,y′}).
Axiom 5 (Weak utility relevance, WUR). For all u,u′ ∈U : supu− infu= supu′− infu′,
ux = u′x′ and uy = u
′
y′ ⇒ Pr(x|u,{x,y}) = Pr(x′|u′,{x′,y′}).
As indicated, the behavioral evidence suggests that assumptions stronger than Ax-
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iom 5 may be inadequate, but before I enter this discussion, let me clarify the main result.
Definition 5. The choice profile Pr is conditional logit or contextual logit (respectively)
if there exists λ ∈ R such that for all choice tasks (u,B) ∈ D and all options x ∈ B,
Pr(x|u,B) =V (x|u)/∑x′∈BV (x′|u) with
V (x|u) = exp{λ ·ux}, (Conditional logit)
V (x|u) = exp{λ ·ux/(supu− infu)}. (Contextual logit)
Theorem 1.
1. Pr is conditional logit⇔ Pr satisfies Axioms 1, 2, 4
2. Pr is contextual logit⇔ Pr satisfies Axioms 1, 3, 5
Briefly, let me discuss the relative contributions of the three axioms per representa-
tion. By IIA, Pr has a Luce representation, and by narrow bracketing, choice propensities
have the form Vu(x,ux − infu). Now, by WUR, options with equal utility must have
equal choice propensities, i.e. ux = uy implies Vu(x,ux− infu) = Vu(y,uy− infu), which
in turn implies Vu(x,ux− infu) = Vu(y,ux− infu). As a result, using any u−1 such that
u(u−1(ux)) = ux for all x, we can define a function V˜u(ux) = Vu(u−1(ux),ux− infu) rep-
resenting choice propensities solely as functions of utilities. This does not yet eliminate
presentation effects, but it restricts the functional form of choice probabilities. Again,
take u ∈U such that ux = 2 and uy = 0. Fix u′ = u+ 8, implying u′x = 10 and u′y = 8.
By narrow bracketing, we know that the relative probability of choosing x over y is the
same in both contexts. Now assume ux′ = 10 and uy′ = 8 for some x′,y′ ∈ X . Since
supu− infu = supu′− infu′, WUR (first equation), transitivity (middle equation), and
the simplified representation of choice propensities (last equation) yield
Pr(x|u′,B)
Pr(y|u′,B) =
Pr(x′|u,B)
Pr(y′|u,B) ⇒
Pr(x|u,B)
Pr(y|u,B) =
Pr(x′|u,B)
Pr(y′|u,B) ⇒
V˜u(ux)
V˜u(uy)
=
V˜u(ux+ r)
V˜u(uy+ r)
for all r ∈ R (in the example, r = 8 was assumed). The generalization to all B ∈ P(X)
obtains by IIA, which in turn yields the implication for propensities. Thus, V˜u(ux+ r) =
V˜u(ux) · f (r), for some function f : R→ R, and differentiating with respect to r implies
dV˜u(ux+ r)/dr = V˜u(ux) · f ′(r) ⇒ dV˜u(ux)/dux = V˜u(ux) · f ′(0)
at r = 0. The solution of this differential equation is V˜ (ux) = exp{λ ·ux+wx}, with λ=
f ′(0) and wx as an integration constant that may depend on x. This yields, as intermediate
result, a generalized conditional logit representation of choice if we start with relative
Luce and use Axiom 4; similarly we obtain a generalized contextual logit representation
if we start with standardized Luce and use Axiom 5.
Definition 6. The choice profile Pr is generalized conditional or contextual logit if there
exist λu ∈ R and wu : X → R for all u ∈U such that for all choice tasks (u,B) ∈ D and
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all options x ∈ B, Pr(x|u,B) =V (x|u)/∑x′∈BV (x′|u) with
V (x|u) = exp{λu ·ux+wu(x)}, (Generalized conditional logit)
V (x|u) = exp{ λu·uxsupu−infu +wu(x)}. (Generalized contextual logit)
Thus, log-propensities are linear in utility, which is the main characteristic of logit
models, but choice may exhibit presentation effects (wu(x) 6= const in x) and context
effects (λu 6= const in u). Thus, random behavior is still contained as special case. By
narrow bracketing, choice propensities can be represented such that λu = λu+r and wu =
wu+r for all r ∈ R. Now fix any r < supu− infu and any x,y,x′,y′ such that ux = ux′+ r
and uy = uy′+ r. By weak utility relevance, using λu = λu+r and wu = wu+r,
Pr(x|u,{x,y})
Pr(y|u,{x,y}) =
Pr(x′|u+ r,{x′,y′})
Pr(y′|u+ r,{x′,y′}) ⇒
exp{λu ·ux+wu(x)}
exp{λu ·uy+wu(y)} =
exp{λu ·ux+wu(x′)}
exp{λu ·uy+wu(y′)}
we obtain wu(x) = wu(x′) · c(r) and wu(y) = wu(y′) · c(r) for some function c : R→ R.
Applying this idea for all x,y ∈ X and all r < supu− infu, we find that c(r) cancels out,
implying wu(x) = const in x and thus cancels out. Now, presentation effects and random
behavior are ruled out. It is then straightforward to rule out context effects using Axiom
4 in the case of conditional logit and Axiom 5 in the case of contextual logit.
4 Discussion
4.1 The axioms
Independence of irrelevant alternatives IIA had been introduced to analyses of stochas-
tic choice by Luce (1959) and was criticized immediately (Debreu, 1960). Inspired by
Debreu’s red-bus/blue-bus example, logit has been generalized in many studies to reflect
similarity effects, see for example nested logit (McFadden, 1976) and cross-nested logit
(Vovsha, 1997; Wen and Koppelman, 2001). Such generalizations are routinely used for
example in transportation research. In turn, models relaxing IIA are hardly used in indus-
trial economics and virtually never in experimental analyses. The reasons appear to be
that in demand estimation, similarity effects are not required to capture product differen-
tiation (Nevo, 2000), though applications of nested logit in this context exist (Anderson
and de Palma, 1992). Economic experiments generally avoid redundant options to enable
clean inference (Davis and Holt, 1993), which limits similarity effects and thus models
relaxing IIA are not considered necessary (there does not appear to be a single published
paper using e.g. nested logit). Thus, IIA seems to be a reasonable assumption in applica-
tions relating to utility and demand estimation, but as all models derived here are random
utility models (see below), generalizations such as nested logit are straightforward.
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Cardinality and narrow bracketing Standard representation theorems for rational
choice imply that utility is defined up to affine transformation, but representation the-
orems for stochastic choice do not explicitly imply this property (see e.g. Dagsvik, 2008,
2015). To further discuss cardinality, let me distinguish whether (1) an analyst can in-
fer utility only up to affine transformation and (2) choice predictions are robust to affine
transformation. The former appears to be the conventional interpretation of cardinality,
while Axiom 3 requires the latter. Under rational choice, these two interpretations are
equivalent, but under stochastic choice, the former does not imply the latter. When in-
ferring utility from choice using logit, for example, λ is unknown and a free parameter,
which implies that affine transformations are indistinguishable by the analyst. Logit’s
predictions are robust only to utility translation, as λ then is fixed. Thus, from a norma-
tive perspective, logit satisfies robustness to affine transformations at least in inference,
and explicitly requiring the cardinality axiom is not theoretically indicated.
From a positive perspective, however, the cardinality axiom appears to be adequate.
On the one hand, experimental work generally finds that after controlling for individual
heterogeneity due to e.g. age, education and gender, behavior in experiments is usually
independent of socio-economic background variables such as income or wealth (Gächter
et al., 2004; Bellemare et al., 2008, 2011). This suggests that background utility indeed
factors out and Axiom 2 (narrow bracketing) is adequate. On the other hand, across
studies, experimental behavior is independent of the amounts of money at stake in ex-
periments. This is robustly reported from meta-studies on dictator games (Engel, 2011),
ultimatum games (Oosterbeek et al., 2004; Cooper and Dutcher, 2011), and trust games
(Johnson and Mislin, 2011). Holt and Laury (2002) find that risk aversion increases as
stakes are raised, but this may equally represent an artifact of the choice model used
(Wilcox, 2008). Since the utility functions used in analysis of standard experiments
are homogeneous of positive degree in the payoffs,16 scaling of payoffs induces scal-
ing of utilities, and these results suggest that choice behavior is robust to scaling utilities.
Jointly, the existing evidence therefore suggests that the cardinality axiom indeed is ade-
quate. Since narrow bracketing is weaker than cardinality, it is of course not inadequate in
turn. Relying on the weaker assumption of narrow bracketing requires a complementary
stronger assumption on context independence, however.
Strict/Weak context independence Axioms 4 and 5 entail assumptions on context in-
dependence and presentation independence, as discussed above. First, let me focus on
context independence. The assumption of strict or weak context independence comple-
ments the assumption on transformation invariance, i.e. narrow bracketing or cardinality.
Context independence clarifies in which circumstances equal utilities imply equal proba-
bilities, while narrow bracketing and cardinality clarify in which circumstances different
utilities imply equal probabilities. Due to this interrelation, these axioms cannot be cho-
sen independently. Specifically, cardinality is not compatible with strict context indepen-
16This is true for CRRA utilities and Prospect theoretic utilities as used in analyses of choice under risk,
for CES functions used in distribution experiments, and for inequity aversion used in ultimatum games.
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dence, choice simply cannot satisfy both axioms. If it satisfies the former, it violates the
latter. As discussed before, empirical evidence supports the cardinality axiom.
Specifically, the previous observation that choice is invariant to utility scaling im-
plies that the error variance adapts to the utility range, which I call weak context depen-
dence. Weak context dependence has been observed in a large number of studies and
inspired choice models with “heteroscedastic” errors, see e.g. Hey (1995) and Buschena
and Zilberman (2000). Contextual logit is a heteroscedastic model that additionally al-
lows to define the relation “more risk averse” between decision makers (Wilcox, 2011).
Wilcox (2008, 2015) shows that the notion of weak context dependence fits behavior
fairly accurately, and Padoa-Schioppa and Rustichini (2014) discuss neurophysiological
evidence for such “adaptive coding” in the orbitofrontal cortex. The range of neurophys-
iological stimuli is exogenously fixed, and to use the available resources efficiently, the
best-possible outcome always induces maximal neural stimulus and the worst-possible
outcome induces the minimal neural stimulus. Thus, sensitivity adapts to the outcome
range, as in contextual logit, inducing weak context dependence as in Axiom 5.
Presentation independence Presentation independence requires that reordering utili-
ties is equivalent to reordering choice probabilities and implies that only option utilities
are choice relevant. There exists plenty of evidence contradicting this assumption, e.g.
default effects (McKenzie et al., 2006; Dinner et al., 2011; Spiegler, 2015), ordering
or positioning effects (Dean, 1980; Miller and Krosnick, 1998; Feenberg et al., 2015),
the left-most digit bias (Poltrock and Schwartz, 1984; Lacetera et al., 2012), and round-
number effects (Heitjan and Rubin, 1991; Manski and Molinari, 2010). To illustrate the
magnitude, Figure 1 provides histograms of transfers in dictator games from two exper-
iments under mostly identical conditions. Essentially, the only difference between the
experiments is the user interface: the number of tokens to be transferred is entered either
manually (Figure 1a) or graphically, via mouse and slider (Figure 1b). The choice tasks
are otherwise virtually equivalent, but the differences in choice patterns are drastic. The
manual entry of numbers induces strong round number effects, which in turn biases pa-
rameter estimates. These observations and similar ones on default and ordering effects
suggest that presentation effects are of first-order relevance, alongside context effects,
which suggests that models relaxing presentation independence are critical for reliable
estimation of utility. A companion paper (Breitmoser, 2016) analyzes such models.
4.2 Relation to random utility models
Yellott (1977) shows that if choice exhibits IIA and admits a random utility representa-
tion, then it is logit and the utility perturbations are extreme value type 1. This raised the
question which behavioral assumptions are made when using the random utility repre-
sentation and whether they are testable. Theorem 1 shows that in addition to IIA, narrow
bracketing and strict utility relevance are equivalent to logit choice. Thus, given IIA,
adopting the random utility representation is equivalent to assuming narrow bracketing
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Figure 1: Dictator games where transfers are set by either manual or graphical (“slider”)
choice
(a) Andreoni and Miller (2002)
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(b) Fisman et al. (2007)
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Note: These treatments are representative for choice distributions in the two experiments. In these treat-
ments, for each token given up by the dictator, two tokens are added to the recipients account.
and strict utility relevance. The random utility representation Eq. (6) clearly implies these
choice properties, and given IIA, Theorem 1 shows that these assumptions also imply the
random utility model, rendering it testable.
The other models studied here also have random utility representations. Contextual
logit has one using the normalized utility function u˜= u/(supu− infu), and for example,
generalized conditional logit, has one using u˜ = u+ w˜, with w˜ = w/λ, as
Pr(x|u,B) = exp{λ ·ux+w(x)}
∑x′∈B exp{λ ·ux′+w(x′)}
=
exp{λ · (ux+ w˜(x))}
∑x′∈B exp{λ · (ux′+w(x′))}
. (12)
This implies that for all these models, relaxing IIA is straightforward—simply by as-
suming a generalized extreme value distribution to capture similarity effects (McFadden,
1976). For example, the corresponding “generalized nested logit” model allows for both
presentation effects and similarity effects, and contextual nested logit models may cap-
ture choice based on cardinal utility functions exhibiting similarity effects.
4.3 The intuition underlying logit
Finally, let me discuss logit’s computational intuition. To this end, let me first clarify un-
der which assumptions choice utility is guaranteed to be an affine transformation of true
utility. Generalizing Definition 1 to multiple contexts, the choice profile Pr is called “un-
conditional logit” if there exists a family of functions {vu : X → R}u∈U such that for all
choice tasks (u,B)∈D and all options x∈B, Pr(x|u,B)= exp{vu(x)}/∑x′∈B exp{vu(x′)}.
For later reference, define choice utility vu as follows.
Definition 7. Choice utility vu in context u ∈U is vu(x) = logPr(x|u,X) for all x ∈ X .
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Thus, choice utility is well-defined; any other definition would be equally admis-
sible. Now, if Pr has a conditional logit presentation in context u, then it also has an
unconditional logit representation, and given the definition of choice utility, we know
Pr(x|u,B) = exp{vu(x)}
∑x′∈B exp{vu(x′)}
=
exp{λ ·ux}
∑x′∈B exp{λ ·ux′}
(13)
for all x ∈ B and B ∈ P(X). Hence, vu(x) = a+λux for some a ∈ R, and using vu(x) =
logPr(x|u,X), we obtain
1 = ∑
x′∈X
exp{vu(x′)}= ∑
x′∈B
exp{a+λ ·ux′} ⇔ a = 1/ log ∑
x′∈B
exp{λ ·ux′}.
Thus, choice utility appears to be a choice- and context-dependent affine transformation
of true utility, as the additive constant a depends on both λ and u. This represents an
obstacle to logit’s computational interpretation. The next result shows that utilities may
be normalized to ensure a context-independent relation of choice utility and true utility.
Theorem 2. If Pr is conditional logit or contextual logit, then choice utility v is an affine
transformation of true utility u. Specifically:
1. Axioms 1, 2, 4⇔ Pr is conditional logit⇔ vu− infvu = λ · (u− infu) ∀u ∈U
2. Axioms 1, 3, 5⇔ Pr is contextual logit⇔ vu− infvu = λ · u−infusupu−infu ∀u ∈U
with λ as obtained in the conditional/contextual logit presentation (respectively).
The normalization of choice utility vu by subtracting the infimum reflects that v is
defined only up to adding arbitrary constants. Similarly, in conditional logit, utility is
defined up to translation which requires subtraction of the infimum for comparability.
In contextual logit, utility is defined only up to affine transformation, which requires
standardization to a specific interval, here [0,1], for comparability.
To discuss logit’s intuition, let me begin with the known intuition underlying ran-
dom behavior. Random behavior models with normal trembles implicitly determine the
average choice and compute the utility parameters rationalizing this choice. This is com-
putationally simple, but assumes that relative choice probabilities of different options are
not informative with respect to their utility differences, i.e. with respect to the shape of
the estimated utility function. Only the average choice is considered informative and
reveals all that we may learn about parameters and shape of the utility function.
By Theorem 2, using logit, utility parameters are estimated such that choice utilities
of all options are proportional to their calibrated true utilities. Since choice utilities are
simply transformations of choice probabilities, logit thus assumes that relative choice
probabilities are functions of utility differences, and that the shape of the probability
distribution contains information about the shape of the utility function. This is supported
by a number of behavioral analyses, including McKelvey and Palfrey (1998), Battalio
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et al. (2001), and Weizsäcker (2003). Further, by Theorem 2, utility parameters can be
estimated by regression, which illustrates the relation of choice utility and true utility
transparently and avoids exposure of the analyst to logit’s functional form.
The resulting utility parameters also have an independent interpretation. Let u(x|α)
denote the utility of option x∈ X given parameter α∈Rk, k≥ 1, and consider a set of ob-
servations O where all elements are observations of choices x ∈ X . Given O, let (λ?,α?)
denote the maximum likelihood estimates to be interpreted. Define cα = ∑x′∈X exp{λ? ·
u(x′|α)} for all α and based on that the normalized utility u˜(·|α) = u(·|α) · cα?/cα. This
normalization simply ensures that changing α does not affect the average propensity, i.e.
that utility levels are comparable for all α, or formally ∑x′∈X exp{λ? · u˜(x′|α)} is constant
in α. This normalization is made without loss of generality in the sense that it does not
bias the estimates,17
argmax
λ,α
∏
x∈O
exp{λu(x|α)}
∑x′∈X exp{λu(x′|α)}
= argmax
λ,α
∏
x∈O
exp{λ u˜(x|α)}
∑x′∈X exp{λ u˜(x′|α)}
= (λ?,α?).
but because the utility level is now independent of α, it allows us to interpret logit’s
maximum likelihood estimate of α given λ= λ?, which is
argmax
α ∏x∈O
exp{λ u˜(x|α)}
∑x′∈X exp{λ u˜(x′|α)}
= argmax
α ∏x∈O
exp{λ u˜(x|α)}
= argmax
α ∑x∈O
λ u˜(x|α) = argmax
α ∑x∈O
u˜(x|α). (14)
That is, the logit estimate of α maximizes DM’s total utility across choices, or in turn,
logit yields the utility parameters for which DM’s choices make the most sense with
hindsight, portraying DM as close to utility maximization as possible. In contrast, ran-
dom behavior (least squares) yields the parameters rationalizing just the average choice,
considering all deviations from the mean to be plainly uninformative mistakes.
5 Conclusion
Multinomial logit is widely used to estimate utility and demand functions. McFadden
(2001) argues that its appeal relates to its “fully consistent” axiomatic foundation linking
individual characteristics (such as utilities) and choice probabilities. Yet, logit analyses
are persistently criticized for making specific functional assumptions and indeed, all four
existing foundations of logit require functional assumptions. The present paper resolves
this critique in the sense that it provides a behavioral foundation of logit without such
assumptions, building solely on invariance assumptions: independence of irrelevant al-
ternatives and invariance to utility translation (narrow bracketing), to relabeling (presen-
17This obtains, as logit estimates are robust to rescaling utilities. The scaling factor cα
?
/cα used here is
a function of α, but as λ and α are independent, λ being a free parameter comprehends this case.
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tation independence), and to changing utilities of third options (context independence).
These assumptions further imply the existence of a precision parameter λ and that λ is
constant across contexts, as generally assumed in applications.
This addresses the above critique, and perhaps most notably, logit is the implica-
tion of axioms obeyed fairly widely, even in presumably robust approaches such as least
squares. This suggests that these axioms may be considered consensual, rendering logit
a general model of choice. In contrast, least squares additionally assumes DM perceives
utility to be biased in a specific way, i.e. that DM uses a utility function that differs from
the one assumed and estimated by the analyst. This is an additional, functional assump-
tions, implying that least squares is a more demanding, less general approach than logit.
Clarifying logit’s behavioral foundation facilitates an evidence-based discussion of
choice modeling. The existing behavioral evidence suggests that two of logit’s assump-
tions are systematically violated in experiments: context independence and presentation
independence. Thus, logit is less generally adequate than its relation to least squares
suggests. Relaxing context independence in accordance with behavioral evidence yields
contextual logit (Wilcox, 2011). Contextual logit thus promises to enable utility esti-
mation under comparably robust assumptions, while maintaining logit’s tractability. In
turn, relaxing presentation independence allows to capture “focality” effects due to e.g.
positioning or labeling of options, which is analyzed in detail in a companion paper (Bre-
itmoser, 2016). The corresponding generalized logit models constitute a first generally
applicable approach of capturing presentation dependence of choice. Further theoretical
and behavioral analysis of presentation dependence is required to enable reliable utility
estimation and to reliably predict nudging effects.
Finally, recent studies of individual choice have led to a surge of models capturing
behavioral biases. These studies extend the toolkit available in applied work tremen-
dously, allowing to account for a wide range of biases including limited consideration sets
(Masatlioglu et al., 2012; Manzini and Mariotti, 2014), salience (Bordalo et al., 2012),
focusing (Ko˝szegi and Szeidl, 2013), choice aversion (Fudenberg and Strzalecki, 2015),
certainty effects (Cerreia-Vioglio et al., 2015), and satisficing (Tyson, 2008; Papi, 2012).
The respective models are founded either in rational choice or as generalized Luce mod-
els, i.e. their application on data requires further assumptions on error distributions. The
results in the present paper complement these studies in this respect, and are comple-
mented by them in turn. These recent studies show how to relax say IIA in the above
analysis to account for a number of prominent choice biases. In turn, the above results
show that logit and contextual logit allow to extend these novel choice models in an
axiomatically consistent manner, rendering them directly applicable in empirical work.
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Appendix
A Proofs of Lemmas 1 and 2
Proof of Lemma 1 Fix u ∈ U and define ux = ux for all x ∈ X . The claimed value
function V (x|u) is independent of B, which implies that the resulting choice representa-
tion satisfies IIA (establishing ⇒). To prove that IIA implies Luce (⇐), note first that
Pr(x|u,{x,y}) is in general a function of x,y,ux,uy. By positivity, it is possible to define
V (x,y,ux,uy) := Pr(x|u,{x,y})/Pr(y|u,{x,y}), and thus by IIA (see McFadden, 1974, p.
109, for details),
Pr(x|u,B) = V (x,y,ux,uy)
∑x′∈BV (x′,y,ux′,uy)
for all x,y ∈ B and all B ∈ P(X). (15)
Since this holds true for all x,y ∈ B and all B ∈ P(X), and it does so for all y ∈ X . Hence,
the odds of choosing x over x′ are constant for any pair of benchmark options y,y′ ∈ X ,
Pr(x|u,B)
Pr(x′|u,B) =
V (x,y,ux,uy)
V (x′,y,ux′,uy)
=
V (x,y′,ux,uy′)
V (x′,y′,ux′,uy′)
for all x,x′,y,y′ ∈B and all B∈P(X).
and by convexity of X in R (richness), this can be expressed as
d
dy
V (x,y,ux,uy)
V (x′,y,ux′,uy)
= 0.
As a result, functions f (y,uy) and V1(x,ux) exist such that V (x,y,ux,uy) = V1(x,ux) ·
f (y,uy) for all x,y ∈ X , and we can write, for all B ∈ P(X), x ∈ B and y ∈ X ,
Pr(x|u,B) = V (x,y,ux,uy)
∑x′∈BV (x′,y,ux′,uy)
=
V1(x,ux)
∑x′∈BV1(x′,ux′)
.
Thus, the Luce representation obtains for any u ∈U, establishing⇐.
Proof of Lemma 2 If Pr is relative Luce with (λu,wu) = (λu˜,wu˜) for all u, u˜ ∈U with
u˜= u+ r (r ∈R), it satisfies Axioms 1 and 2, establishing⇐ in point 1. If Pr is standard-
ized Luce with (λu,wu) = (λu˜,wu˜) for all affine u, u˜ ∈U satisfies Axioms 1 and 3, estab-
lishing⇐ in point 2. In turn, by Lemma 1, Pr satisfies IIA (if and) only if there exists V
such that Pr(x|u,B) =V (x|u)/∑x′∈BV (x′|u) for all x∈ B and all (u,B)∈D . That is, there
exists a collection of functions (Vu)u∈U such that Pr(x|u,B) =Vu(x,ux)/∑x′∈BVu(x′,ux′).
Now fix u∈U and note that, given this representation of Pr, by both Axiom 2 and Axiom
A-1
3 we obtain
Vu
(
x,ux
)
∑x′∈BVu
(
x′,ux′
) = Vu+r(x,ux+ r)
∑x′∈BVu+r
(
x′,ux′+ r
) for all r ∈ R and (u,B) ∈D. (16)
Next define the auxiliary functions (V˜u)u∈U such that V˜u(x,ux− infu) = Vu(x,ux) for all
x ∈ X and all u ∈ U. Hence, Pr(x|u,B) = V˜u(x,ux− infu)/∑x′∈B V˜u(x′,ux′ − infu), and
given Eq. (16), this implies
V˜u
(
x,ux− infu
)
∑x′∈B V˜u
(
x′,ux′− infu
) = V˜u+r(x,ux+ r− inf(u+ r))
∑x′∈B V˜u+r
(
x′,ux′+ r− inf(u+ r)
) = V˜u+r(x,ux− infu)
∑x′∈B V˜u+r
(
x′,ux′− infu
)
for all r ∈ R, (u,B) ∈ D , x ∈ B. Hence, Pr has a relative Luce representation with V˜u =
V˜u+r for all u ∈U and all r ∈ R, establishing⇒ in point 1.
Based on that, fix u ∈ U such that supu− infu = 1 and note that by Axiom 3,
Pr(x|u,B) = Pr(x|u · r,B) for all r > 0, i.e.
Pr(x|u · r,B) = Pr(x|u,B) = V˜u
(
x,ux− infu
)
∑x′∈B V˜u
(
x′,ux′− infu
) = V˜u(x, rux−infrusupru−infru)
∑x′∈B V˜u
(
x′, rux′−infrusupru−infru
)
for all r > 0, B∈ P(X), x∈ B; note that supru− infru= r, since supu− infu= 1. Hence,
Pr(x|u ·r,B) has a standardized Luce representation with V˜ru = V˜u for all r > 0. By above,
we already know V˜r+u = V˜u for all r ∈R, implying V˜u = V˜a+bu for all a,b ∈R : b > 0 and
all u ∈U, establishing⇒ in point 2.
B Proof of Theorem 1
First, let me extend the domain the utility functions to budget sets, with corresponding
utility sets as value.
Definition 8. Pick any u ∈ U and B ∈ P(X). Define n := |B| and bi, i = 1, . . . ,n, such
that B = {bi}i=1,...,n. Then, u(B) := {u(bi)}i=1,...,n.
By IIA, Axiom 4 implies that for all u, u˜ ∈U, all B, B˜ ∈ P(X), and all x ∈ B,y ∈ B˜,
u(B) = u˜(B˜) and ux = u˜y ⇔ Pr(x |u,B) = Pr(y | u˜, B˜) (17)
Correspondingly, Axiom 5 implies that (17) holds if supu− infu = supu′− infu′.
Proof of Point 1,⇒: By Lemma 2, Pr satisfies Axioms 1 and 2 if and only if it has a
relative Luce representation. Logit satisfies Axiom 4, establishing⇒.
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Proof of Point 1, ⇐: We have to show that, given Axioms 1 and 2, Axiom 4 implies
logit.
Step 1 (Representation independently of x):
Pick any u ∈U and x,y ∈ X . By Axiom 4, if ux = uy, then Pr(x|u,B) = Pr(y|u,B) for any
B ∈ P(X) such that x,y ∈ B, and thus
ux = uy ⇒ Vu(x,ux− infu) =Vu(y,ux− infu). (18)
Thus, choice propensities in any given context u ∈U solely depend on utilities. For any
u ∈U , fix an inverse u−1 such that u(u−1(r)) = r for all r in the image of u. Note that
this inverse is not generally unique, but by the previous observation, the propensities
Vu(u−1(ux),ux− infu) are independent of which inverse is chosen. Hence, we can define
a function V˜u : R→ R+ by V˜u(ux) =Vu(u−1(ux),ux− infu), such that
Pr(x|u,B) = V˜u(ux)
∑x′∈B V˜u(ux′)
for all x ∈ B,(u,B) ∈D, (19)
representing propensities solely as functions of utilities ux. Note that this does not rule
out presentation effects; V˜u depends on context u∈U, and the result merely states that ux
contains the information required to implicitly represent presentation effects for any u.
Step 2 (Generalized logit representation):
Define x,y∈X and x′,y′ ∈X such that (1) uy−ux = r, (2) uy′−ux′ = r, and (3) ux′−ux = r,
for some r ∈ R. Hence, u′x = ux′ and u′y = uy′ . Thus, by Axiom 4 (first equality, note that
Axiom 5 actually suffices) and Axiom 2 (second equality)
Pr(x′|u,{x′,y′})
Pr(y′|u,{x′,y′}) =
Pr(x|u′,{x,y})
Pr(y|u′,{x,y}) =
Pr(x|u,{x,y})
Pr(y|u,{x,y}) . (20)
Using the representation from Eq. (19), for all r < (supu− infu)/2 and all B ∈ P(X),
V˜u(ux)
∑x′∈B V˜u(ux′)
=
V˜u(ux+ r)
∑x′∈B V˜u(ux′+ r)
for all X ∈ B and (u,B) ∈D. (21)
Hence, V˜u(ux + r) = V˜u(ux) · h(r) for r ≈ 0 (and some function h : R→ R), implying
V˜u(ux + r)/V˜u(ux) = h(r), i.e. it is independent of ux and hence it is differentiable in ux,
hence logV˜u(ux + r)− logV˜u(ux) is differentiable in ux, and thus V˜u(ux + r) and V˜u(ux)
are differentiable in ux. Differentiating V˜u(ux+ r) = V˜u(ux) ·h(r) at r = 0, we obtain
dV˜u(ux)/dux = V˜u(ux) ·h′(0) ⇒ V˜u(ux) = exp{λ ·ux+ c(x)}
as the solution of this differential equation, for some integration constant c(x). Hence,
Vu(x,ux) = exp{λ · ux +w(x)} with w(x) := c(x) for all x ∈ X . As this holds separately
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for all u ∈U, V (x|u) = exp{λu ·ux+wu(x)} obtains, i.e.
Pr(x|u,B) = exp{λu ·ux+wu(x)}
∑x′∈B exp{λu ·ux′+wu(x′)}
. (22)
Finally, by narrow bracketing, this implies that we can represent Pr using λu = λu+r as
well as wu = wu+r for all r ∈ R , as then
Pr(x|u+r,B)= exp{λu · (ux+ r)+wu(x)}
∑x′∈B exp{λu · (ux′+ r)+wu(x′)}
.=
exp{λu ·ux+wu(x)}
∑x′∈B exp{λu ·ux′+wu(x′)}
=Pr(x|u,B).
Step 3:
Now, pick any u ∈U and x,y ∈ X such that ux = uy. By Axiom 4, Pr(x|u,B) = Pr(y|u,B)
for any B ∈ P(X) such that x,y ∈ B. Given that Pr satisfies Eq. (22), we thus obtain that
ux = uy implies wu(x) = wu(y). Hence, it is possible to represent wu alternatively as a
function of ux, instead of x, showing that the representation Eq. (22) does not violate the
result of Step 1 (that propensities may be represented solely as a function of utilities).
Step 4 (Presentation independence):
Next, take any u ∈ U, any u˜ ∈ U, and define u′ = a+ bu (a,b ∈ R : b > 0) such that
infu′ ≤ inf u˜ and supu′ > sup u˜; such u′ ∈U exists by richness (transformability). Define
X ′ ⊆ X such that for all x ∈ X , there is exactly one x′ ∈ X ′ : u′x = u′x′ . Define X˜ such that
for each x ∈ X , there is exactly one x˜ ∈ X˜ : ux = u˜x˜.
Define the function f : X ′→ [infu′,supu′] as f (x′) = ux′ for all x′ ∈ X ′. Note that f
is a bijection and thus invertible. Extend f and f−1 to be set functions as in Definition 8.
Pick any finite B˜ ⊂ X˜ and define B′ = f−1(u˜(B˜)). Thus, |B′| = |B˜| and u˜(B˜) = f (B′) =
u′(B′).
For any y ∈ B˜, if x = f−1(u˜y), then u˜y = f (x) = u′x, and by Axiom 4,
Pr(y | u˜, B˜) = Pr(x |u′,B′) = exp{λu′ ·u
′
x+wu′(x)}
∑x′∈B′ exp{λu′ ·u′x′+wu′(x′)}
.
As stated, this obtains for all y ∈ B˜ and all B˜ ⊂ X˜ (with corresponding x and B′). Using
the above result that for all x,y ∈ X , u˜x = u˜y implies wu˜(x) = wu˜(y), we thus obtain
Pr(x | u˜,B) = exp{λu′ · u˜x+wu′( f
−1(u˜x))}
∑x′∈B exp{λu′ · u˜x′+wu′( f−1(u˜x′))}
for all x ∈ B and all B ∈ P(X). Defining λˆ = λu′ and wˆ : [infu′,supu′]→ R such that
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wˆ(u′x) = wu′(x) for all x ∈ X ′, this implies
Pr(x | u˜,B) = exp{λˆ · u˜x+ wˆ(u˜x)}
∑x′∈B exp{λˆ · u˜x′+ wˆ(u˜x′)}
. (23)
Since this holds true for all u˜ such that infu′ ≤ inf u˜ and supu′ ≥ sup u˜, it also holds true
for u˜ε = u˜+ ε if 0 < ε≤ supu′− sup u˜, implying
Pr(x | u˜ε,B) = exp{λˆ · [u˜x+ ε]+ wˆ(u˜x+ ε)}
∑x′∈B exp{λˆ · [u˜x′+ ε]+ wˆ(u˜x′+ ε)}
=
exp{λˆ · u˜x+ wˆ(u˜x+ ε)}
∑x′∈B exp{λˆ · u˜x′+ wˆ(u˜x′+ ε)}
.
By Axiom 2, Pr(x | u˜,B) = Pr(x | u˜ε,B), and thus there exists a function h : R→ R such
that wˆ(u˜x + ε) = wˆ(u˜x)+ h(ε), i.e. ε cancels out. Hence, we can represent propensities
given u˜ε equivalently as wˆ(u˜x + ε) = wˆ(u˜x) for all ε ≤ supu′− sup u˜ and all x ∈ X . By
surjectivity of u˜ (richness), it follows that wˆ is constant, which implies that wu′ and wu˜
are constant and cancel out. Hence, for any u˜ ∈U, Pr(x | u˜,B) has a logit representation
with λ= λu˜ = λu′ .
Step 5 (Context independence):
Pick any two u˜1, u˜2 ∈U, and any u′ ∈U such that u′ = a+bu (a,b ∈R : b > 0) such that
infu′≤ inf{u˜1, u˜2} and supu′≤ inf{u˜1, u˜2}. By the previous results, both Pr(x | u˜1,B) and
Pr(x | u˜1,B) have logit representations with λu˜1 = λu˜2 = λu′ , establishing Point 1,⇐.
Proof of Point 2, ⇒: By Lemma 2, Pr satisfies Axioms 1 and 3 if and only if it has
a standardized Luce representation. Contextual logit satisfies Axiom 5, establishing⇒.
Proof of Point 2, ⇐: We have to show that, given Axioms 1 and 3, Axiom 5 implies
contextual logit.
Steps 1–2 (Generalized contextual logit):
First, fix u ∈U such that supu− infu = 1. Hence,
Pr(x|u,B) =
Vu
(
x, ux−infusupu−infu
)
∑x′∈BVu
(
x′, ux′−infusupu−infu
) = Vu(x,ux− infu)∑x′∈BVu(x′,ux′− infu) ,
i.e. conditional on context u, Pr also a relative Luce representation. Thus we may follow
the arguments in the proof of Point 1 (⇐), up to Eq. (22), and obtain
Pr(x|u,B) = exp{λu ·ux+wu(x)}
∑x′∈B exp{λu ·ux′+wu(x′)}
=
exp
{ λu·ux
supu−infu +wu(x)
}
∑x′∈B exp
{ λu·ux′
supu−infu +wu(x
′)
} ,
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with λu+r = λu and wu+r = wu for all r ∈ R. By Axiom 3, Pr(x|u,B) = Pr(x|u · r,B) for
all r > 0, i.e.
Pr(x|u ·r,B)=Pr(x|u,B)= exp{λu ·ux+wu(x)}
∑x′∈B exp{λu ·ux′+wu(x′)}
=
exp
{ λu·rux
supru−infru +wu(x)
}
∑x′∈B exp
{ λu·rux′
supru−infru +wu(x
′)
}
for all r > 0, B∈ P(X), x∈ B; note that supru− infru= r, since supu− infu= 1. Hence,
using u′ = ru,
Pr(x|u′,B) =
exp
{ λu′ ·u′x
supu′−infu′ +wu′(x)
}
∑x′∈B exp
{ λu′ ·u′x′
supu′−infu′ +wu′(x
′)
} ,
with wu′ = wu and λu′ = λu. By above, we already know wr+u = wu and λr+u = λu for
all r ∈ R, implying λu = λa+bu and wu = wa+bu for all a,b ∈ R : b > 0 and all u ∈U.
Step 3: Next, pick any u∈U and any x,y∈ X such that ux = uy. By Axiom 5, this implies
wu(x) = wu(y), i.e. ux = uy implies wu(x) = wu(y).
Step 4 (Presentation independence):
Now, pick any u′, u˜ ∈ U such that infu′ = inf u˜ = 0 and supu′ = sup u˜ = 1. Note that
supu′− infu′ = sup u˜− inf u˜ = 1 initially allows me to drop the normalization by supu−
infu in the choice propensities. Given this restriction of the images of u′ and u˜, Axiom 5
implies, simply following the proof above, up to Eq. (23),
Pr(x | u˜,B) = exp{λˆ · u˜x+ wˆ(u˜x)}
∑x′∈B exp{λˆ · u˜x′+ wˆ(u˜x′)}
.
for all x∈ B and all B∈ P(X), with λˆ= λu′ = λu′/(supu′− infu′) and wˆ : [infu′,supu′]→
R such that wˆ(u′x) = wu′(x) for all x ∈ X ′. Again, define u˜ε = u˜+ ε, with ε > 0. Noting
that the image of u˜ε is not contained in the image of u′, Axiom 5 applies only to options x :
u˜ε(x)≤ 1, but given this restriction, the arguments made in the proof of above, following
Eq. (23) imply
Pr(x | u˜ε,B) = exp{λˆ · u˜x+ wˆ(u˜x+ ε)}
∑x′∈B exp{λˆ · u˜x′+ wˆ(u˜x′+ ε)}
.
for all x ∈ B and all B ∈ P(X) such that max u˜ε(B) ≤ 1. By Axiom 3, Pr(x | u˜,B) =
Pr(x | u˜ε,B), which similarly to above implies wˆ(u˜x+ε) = wˆ(u˜x), now only for all x ∈ X :
ux+ ε≤ 1, but for all ε ∈ (0,1), including all ε≈ 0. Hence, wˆ is constant, implying that
wu′ and wu˜ are constant and that given u′ or u˜, Pr has a contextual logit representation
with λ= λu˜ = λu′ , recalling that supu′− infu′ = 1 and sup u˜− inf u˜ = 1.
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Step 5 (Weak context independence): Finally, pick any two u1,u2 ∈ U. Define u′ =
(u1− infu1)/(supu1− infu1) and u˜= (u2− infu2)/(supu2− infu2). By step 2, λu1 = λu′
and wu1 =wu′ as well as λu2 = λu˜ and wu2 =wu˜. By step 4, λu′ = λu˜ and wu′ =wu˜ = const,
and by transitivity, λu1 = λu2 and wu1 = wu2 = const, implying the latter cancel out and
that given u1 or u2, Pr has a contextual logit representation with the λu1 = λu2 = λ. Since
this obtains for all u1,u2 ∈U, Point 2,⇐ is established.
C Proof of Theorem 2
Proof of Point 1, ⇒: If Pr is conditional logit, then it also has an unconditional logit
representation, and we know by the definition of choice utility vu that, for all u ∈U and
all x ∈ X ,
Pr(x|u,X) = exp{vu(x)}
∑x′∈X exp{vu(x′)}
=
exp{λux}
∑x′∈X exp{λux′}
,
⇔ Pr(x|u,X) = exp{vu(x)− infvu}
∑x′ exp{vu(x′)− infvu}
=
exp{λ(ux− infu)}
∑x′ exp{λ(ux′− infu)}
Now define a sequence (xε) such that limε→0 vu(xε)= infvu, which implies limε→0 u(xε)=
infu as vu = λu+ r for some r ∈ R, and by positivity
lim
ε→0
Pr(xε|u,X)
Pr(x|u,X) =
exp{0}
exp{vu(x)− infvu} =
exp{λ ·0}
exp{λ(ux− infu)}
for all x ∈ X . Hence, vu(x)− infvu = λ(ux− infu) with λ> 0 by richness (choice varia-
tion) for all x ∈ X and u ∈U.
Proof of Point 1, ⇐: Fix u ∈ U. If point 3 holds true, then vu = a+ λu with a =
infvu−λ infu, and by the definition of unconditional logit,
Pr(x|u,B) = exp{vu(x)}
∑x′∈B exp{vu(x′)}
=
exp{a+λux}
∑x′∈B exp{a+λux′}
=
exp{λux}
∑x′∈B exp{λux′}
for all (u,B) ∈D and all x ∈ B, i.e. Pr is has a conditional logit representation for λ.
Proof of Point 2, ⇒: If Pr is contextual logit, then it also has an unconditional logit
representation, and we know by the definition of choice utility vu that, for all u ∈U and
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all x ∈ X ,
Pr(x|u,X) = exp{vu(x)}
∑x′ exp{vu(x′)}
=
exp
{
λ · uxsupu−infu
}
∑x′ exp
{
λ · ux′supu−infu
}
⇔ Pr(x|u,X) = exp{vu(x)− infvu}
∑x′ exp{vu(x′)− infvu}
=
exp
{
λ · ux−infusupu−infu
}
∑x′ exp
{
λ · ux′−infusupu−infu
}
Now define a sequence (xε) such that limε→0 vu(xε)= infvu, which implies limε→0 u(xε)=
infu as vu = au+r, with a= λ/(supu− infu)> 0 by richness (choice variation) and some
r ∈ R, and by positivity
lim
ε→0
Pr(xε|u,X)
Pr(x|u,X) =
exp{0}
exp{vu(x)− infvu} =
exp
{
λ ·0}
exp
{
λ · ux−infusupu−infu
}
for all x ∈ X . Hence, vu(x)− infvu = λ · ux−infusupu−infu for all x ∈ X and u ∈U.
Proof of Point 2,⇐: Fix u ∈U. If point 3 holds true, then vu = a+λ · usupu−infu with
a = infvu−λ · infusupu−infu , and by the definition of unconditional logit,
Pr(x|u,B)= exp{vu(x)}
∑x′∈B exp{vu(x′)}
=
exp{a+λ · uxsupu−infu}
∑x′∈B exp{a+λ · ux′supu−infu}
=
exp{λ · uxsupu−infu}
∑x′∈B exp{λ · ux′supu−infu}
for all (u,B) ∈D and all x ∈ B, i.e. Pr is has a contextual logit representation for λ.
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